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Capital inﬂows and outﬂows often remind policymakers of the monetary policy “trilemma”
and the several associated dilemmas. To tackle these dilemmas, an equilibrium model of capital
ﬂows is proposed. The model captures bouts of capital inﬂows and outﬂows with shocks to
the emerging-market country risk premium. From the equilibrium conditions of the model, an
expression for the accounting of net foreign assets is derived. This expression helps study the
evolution of foreign debt, during capital inﬂows and outﬂows, under ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange
rates. A policy experiment is conducted for the case of a capital outﬂow. It shows that during
a capital outﬂow an interest rate defense of the exchange rate can deliver a recession even in
ﬁnancially resilient economies. This is one possible explanation of the puzzle in Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan [AER Vol. 25 No. 2, 2005]
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1This paper studies capital inﬂows and outﬂows under ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange rates in a
stochastic dynamic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. In addition, the paper proposes a dynamic
equation for the evolution of net foreign assets.
The theoretical literature on capital ﬂows in emerging market economies have focused on unan-
ticipated capital outﬂows, the so called “sudden stops” (Calvo, 1998). Models of sudden stops in-
clude Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005), hereafter CKM, Mendoza (2004), Mendoza and Smith
(2002) and Uribe (2006). In these models sudden stops are triggered by a constraint on foreign
borrowing that suddenly becomes binding. While this mechanism enables the study of capital
outﬂows, for the same reason that a string cannot be pushed, it cannot be used to study capital
inﬂows.
In other papers, e.g. CCV and GGN, the increase in the cost of borrowing and exchange rate
depreciation is a consequence of shocks to the foreign interest rate. But shocks to foreign interest
rates and to the country country risk premium are distinct sources of volatility as was suggested
by Krugman (2000) and Roubini (2002) (p. 597).
In this paper capital outﬂows and inﬂows are the result of changes in risk aversion in interna-
tional ﬁnancial markets and hece to the price of rks, in particular, the price of investing in emerging
markets. Risk aversion can be captured by measures such as CDX spreads and the EMBI spread.
As shocks in the model may be positive or negative (around a theoretical steady-state risk pre-
mium) they can capture capital outﬂows as well as inﬂows. Even though the model does not have
a banking sector, nor realistic features such as banking crisis, when it is subject to large upward
shocks to the country risk premium it can capture the machanisms involved during sudden stops−in
particular those related to the behavior of output, absorption and the trade balance.
An important point about capital outﬂows is the behavior of output. CKM show that sudden
stops should theoretically increase net exports and output and then pose the question as to why
sudden stops cause output drops. In answering this question, they review the literature on models
of sudden stops and show that existing models deliver recessions as the outcome of mechanisms
that are not completely transparent and that lack empirical evidence.
In this paper, sudden stops can result in output drops even under balance sheet conditions that
are not critical. Here recessions do not depend on balance sheet eﬀects alone, but, primarily, on
the response of monetary policy. The point is that not only balance sheet eﬀects but also interest
rate defenses of the exchange rate can explain why sudden stops cause recessions.1
1Interest rate defenses are not exactly equal to “fear of ﬂoating.” On the one hand, interest rate defenses (in the
2Besides the behaviro of output, among the many macroeconomic issues at stake during bouts
of capital inﬂows and outﬂows in emerging economies, other two issues stand out: the monetary
policy regime, and the currency denomination of foreign debt. As suggested by Fisher (2003), these
issues are related since exchange rate rigidity may cause borrowers to underestimate currency risk.
Chang and Velasco (2006) and Chamon and Haussman (2002) have dealt with the link between
the monetary policy regime and the currency denomination of foreign debt. The papers point to
the following conclusions: if foreign debt is denominated in foreign (domestic) currency, the central
bank ﬁnds optimal to peg (ﬂoat) the exchange rate and if the exchange rate is ﬁxed (ﬂoating),
private agents ﬁnd optimal to hold foreign debt in foreign (domestic) currency. For analytical
convenience, these models are highly stylized; in particular, they are one period models.
These papers do convey the message that the choice of monetary policy needs to be closely
related to the choice of the currency denomination of foreign debt. Among the papers that have
studied the topic of the choice of exchange rate regime in a small open economy are Céspedes,
Chang and Velasco (2004) (henceforth CCV), Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2001) (GGN), Cook
(2004), and Devaraux Lane and Xu (2006). These papers have in common that they are based on
the ﬁnancial accelerator and that they do not deal with the currency denomination of foreign debt.
The model in this paper embeds the currency denomination of foreign debt and the exchange rate
regime in a DSGE model.
Besides this introduction, the paper has three sections: the model, results and conclusions. The
section on the model has three main subsections: the ﬁrst one is the problem of each agent and the
general equilibrium, the second one, the complete model; and the third one, an extended model
with the ﬁnancial accelerator. The section on results presents the monetary-policy experiment
under a capital outﬂow. An appendix presents a model with an equilibrium with ﬂexible prices.
Finally, a mathematical appendix presents more detail of the model (the problems of the ﬁrm and
the foreign household, the steady state and the model in state space form), and some mathematical
derivations.2
language of Lahiri and Vegh (2003) or Jeanne and Zettlemeyer (2002)) involve changes in interest rates to avoid
exchange rate volatility. On the other hand, “fear of ﬂoating” in Calvo and Reinhart (2000) also involves large
changes in international reserves.
2Another appendix with detailed step by step mathematial derivations is available from the author on request.
31 The model
The model consists of two economies, one domestic, one foreign. The domestic economy is a
small open economy. The foreign economy is approximately closed. Each economy produces one
good, both goods are tradable. In the domestic economy there are four agents: a representative
household, a representative ﬁrm, a representative distributor ﬁrm, and the central bank. In the
foreign economy there is one agent, the household.
The household issues three types of debt instruments: domestic bonds, foreign bonds denom-
inated in foreign currency and foreign bonds denominated in domestic currency. Domestic bonds
are in zero net supply. Foreign bonds denominated in domestic and foreign currencies are in zero
net supply in the world economy but the domestic economy has a negative net foreign asset position
and rolls over foreign debt forever. As the foreign economy is large, it is approximately closed and
its net foreign asset position tends to zero.
Foreign and domestic currency denominated bonds are traded at spreads φF,t and φH,t over the
foreign interest rate. Country and exchange rate risks are compensated by risk premiums φF,t and
φS,t.3
1.1 The household
The household solves three optimization problems. In the ﬁrst problem, it chooses absorption
and hours worked. In the second problem, the household splits absorption between domestically
produced and imported goods. From the ﬁrst two problems the household indirectly chooses savings
and net foreign assets. In the third one, the household allocates absorption of domestically produced
goods along a continuum of an inﬁnite number of goods.
3Following a long tradition in small open economy models, the domestic or home economy is denoted without
asterisks and the foreign economy, with asterisks. The goods CH,t and CF,t are the home and foreign goods consumed




F,t are the home and foreign goods consumed in the foreign economy.
Needless to say, CH,t and C
∗
F,t are the same good. The same is true for the goods CF,t and C
∗
H,t. Thus, the words
home and foreign refer primarily to each of the two economies and are denoted with and without asterisk. These
words also refer to the two goods but in this case they depend on the context of the economy that is being referred
to. When denoting goods, these words are denoted with subindices H and F. The notation should be clear since the
discussion deals primarily with the small open economy and not with the large, approximately closed economy. The
words home and foreign are also used to qualify the currency denomination of foreign bonds.
41.1.1 The household’s ﬁrst optimization problem

















where Ct is absorption and Lt is labor, and C∆
t and L∆
t+i, the quasi diﬀerence of absorption










where the habits are aggregate per capita
absorption and labor, CA,t and LA,t (since all households are alike, aggregate per capita absorption





Lt + Πt + AT








































Notation is as follows: the Wt is the nominal wage; Pt is the price level; St is the nominal
exchange rate; it is the one-period central-bank nominal policy interest rate, equal to the return
on one period bonds; i∗
t is the one-period foreign interest rate; φF,t is the country risk premium,
deﬁned as the spread of a bond denominated in foreign currency, paid over and above the foreign
interest rate i∗
t; the φH,t is the spread of a foreign bond denominated in domestic currency; AT
t
is net transfers in the balance of payments; Πt is the ﬁrm’s proﬁts; Bt is the domestic one period
bond; and Nt is net worth. The variable B∗
F,t denotes the household’s foreign, one-period bonds
denominated in foreign currency and measured in foreign currency, the variable BH,t denotes the
4Since there is no physical capital in the model, net worth is equal to net foreign assets. Also, since the domestic
ﬁrm does not hold any assets, the household’s net worth is also equal to the economy’s assets.
5household’s foreign, one-period bonds denominated in domestic currency and valued in domestic
currency.5 6 7
Among the ﬁrst order conditions for the household’s problem are the ﬂow budget constraint (2)





























= 1 + it (6)
(1 + i∗
t)(1 + φH,t) = 1 + it (7)






Equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) are standard. Equations (6) to (7) are the ﬁrst order con-
ditions with respect to Bt and B∗
F,t and BH,t. They are the arbitrage conditions among the three
types of bonds; one of these conditions is redundant.
Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), CCV and GGN, country risk follows the
accelerator equation
1 + φF,t = (Nt−1)
−ζ (1 + ε
φF
t ) (9)
The source of volatility in the model is changes in investors’ sentiment or risk appetite ε
φF
t .
Deﬁne the exchange rate risk premium as




5For St the nominal exchange rate, BF,t = StB
∗
F,t is the household’s foreign bonds denominated in foreign currency
and expressed in units of domestic currency, and BH,t = StB
∗
H,t is the household’s bonds denominated in domestic
currency and expressed in domestic currency.
6To help make contact with the concepts of national accounts, note that Yt =
Wt
Pt Lt+Πt is gross domestic product,



















Pt is gross national product, GNP.
7When the variables BH,t and B
∗
F,t are less than zero the emerging economy is a net debtor. When Bt, BH,t and
B
∗
F,t are bigger than zero the emerging economy is a net creditor.
8Use is being made of the notation EtXt+1 = Xt+1|t. Also, up to a ﬁrst order linear approximation Et(Xt+1 Yt+1)
= Xt+1|tYt+1|t.
6Using deﬁnition (10), equations (6) to (8) may be written:
(1 + i∗
t)(1 + φF,t)(1 + φS,t) = 1 + it (11)
(1 + φH,t) = (1 + φF,t)(1 + φS,t) (12)
Equation (11) reveals that the risk free rate, i∗
t, is free of country risk and exchange rate risk,
or in other words, the risky interest rate, it, has country and exchange rate risk.
Equation (12) shows that the spread on foreign bonds denominated in home currency is equal
to the sum of the country and exchange rate risk premiums.
Given the policy experiment in the paper, it is convenient to write the UIP condition in nominal
terms.9 Deﬁning the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate as 1+s∆
t = St
St−1 the lagged








where 1 + εs
t|t−1 = St















Deﬁne two measures of the real exchange rate, ﬁrst, the real bilateral real exchange rate, QB,t =
StP∗
t
Pt ; second, the price of imported goods relative to the price of domestically produced goods,
Qt =
PF,t
Pt . The ﬁrst measure may be written as:
QB,t = QB,t−1
(1 + s∆




where 1 + πt = 1+Pt










9As the nominal exchange rate is not stationary, running the model with the UIP condition in nominal terms
poses a challenge for the stationarity of the model. An alternative is to solve the model for the expected depreciation
of the exchange rate using Equation (6) as 1 + s
∆
t+1|t = (1 + it)/(1 + i
∗
t)(1 + φF,t). However, s
∆
t+1|t is not necessarily
equal to s
∆
t+1; in particular, these variables are not equal to each other when there are unexpected shocks to the UIP
equation−which is the policy experiment in the paper. The UIP condition may be solved for the actual depreciation
of the exchange rate provided the expectation error of the UIP equation is taken into account explicitly. This is what












F,t−1, BH,t−1, Bt−1, such that utility is maximized (Equations (4), (5), (6)
and (8) hold), and markets clear−which means that Equation (2) holds, and the market clearing
condition in the bond market also holds:
Bt = 0. (17)
By plugging equilibrium condition (17) into the balance sheet equation (3) the following equation
obtains:
Nt = StB∗
F,t + BH,t (18)
This shows that, in equilibrium, the household’s net worth is equal to net foreign assets, which
is foreign debt denominated in foreign and domestic currencies.
The household takes the monetary policy reaction function as a given and chooses the currency
denomination of foreign debt.
1.1.2 The household’s second optimization problem
In the second optimization problem, the household allocates absorption between home and foreign
goods by minimizing:
PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t (19)

























H,t = CH,t − γCA,H,t−1
C∆
F,t = CF,t − γCA,F,t−1
In Equation (20),
_
cF is the share of imports in aggregate demand in the steady state, and υ
is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Using the deﬁnition of the
8habit in overall absorption, the habit in domestic and imported absorption is also deﬁned as lagged
aggregate per capita absorption of the domestic and imported goods respectively.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the second problem are:
C∆


































F,t when υ → 1. The inﬂation rate, deﬁned as 1 + πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1, may
be written,











1.1.3 The household’s third optimization problem
In the third optimization problem, the household allocates absorption of home goods along a
continuum of an inﬁnite number of diﬀerentiated goods. Absorption of the domestically produced
good is a composite of an inﬁnite number of goods indexed in the interval (0,1) and produced by
an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms that operate under monopolistic competition.
Let CH,j,t and PH,j,t be the quantity consumed and the price paid for domestically produced
































where the price index of domestically produced goods has been deﬁned as PH,t ≡ λt.
1.2 The ﬁrm
There is an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms that produce a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods under mo-
nopolistic competition.
As the problem solved by the ﬁrm is standard, it is left to the mathematical appendix. The main
result of the ﬁrm’s optimization problem can be expressed as a Phillips curve that, in deviation
form, and in terms of the quasi diﬀerence of inﬂation, π∆
































1.3 The distributor ﬁrm
There is an inﬁnite number of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms that distribute a continuum of
diﬀerentiated imported goods. Following Monacceli (2003), the problem of the distributor gives a




























where 1 + s∆
t = St
St−1.
1.4 The central bank
In the experiments presented in Section 2 the central bank either does not respond to the shock to
the risk premium or perfectly stabilizes the nominal exchange rate. The ﬁrst case can be assimilated
to inﬂation targeting when the central bank does not respond to the shock because it is transitory.
The second one is the case of a ﬁxed nominal exchange rate.










with λ = 0 for the ﬂoating-exchange-rate regime and λ = 1 for the ﬁxed-exchange-rate regime.
The term ǫ
∧
yt is required for the convergence only and does not have any meaningful eﬀect on the
interest rate or the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy.
1.5 The foreign household
For simplicity, the demands for the goods are postulated here as an assumption and their derivation






























The market clearing conditions for the home and the j goods are:
Yt = CH,t + C∗
F,t = Ct + C∗
F,t − CF,t (35)
Yj,t = CH,j,t + C∗
F,j,t (36)
In addition, plugging into (36), the equations (25) and (110) (derived in the mathematical








A general equilibrium at time t for the small open economy is a set of absorption and labor
allocations (Ct, CH,t, CF,t, Lt, CH,j,t, Lt,j for j ∈ (0,1)),assets (B∗
F,t, BH,t,Bt), and prices (it, φH,t,
φS,t, Pt, PH,t, PF,t, Wt, St, PH,j,t for j ∈ (0,1)) such that:
1. households maximize utility, (Equations (4), (5), (6), (8) and (2) are satisﬁed), minimize the
cost of allocating absorption between home and foreign goods (Equations (21), (22), (20)
hold), minimize the cost of allocating domestic absorption along a continuum of home goods
(Equations (25) and (24) hold), and hold foreign debt in foreign currency if λ = 1 and in
domestic currency if λ = 0.
2. ﬁrms (see mathematical appendix) maximize proﬁts (Equations (91, (90), (93) hold);
3. the central bank follows the ad-hoc rule (31);
4. markets clear (conditions (2), (17), (35) and (36) hold);
given φF,t, AT
t , Zt, B∗
F,t−1,BH,t−1, Bt−1, i∗
t, and Y ∗
t .
1.8 The three key equations of the model
1.8.1 The law of evolution of net worth
In order to obtain the law of evolution of net worth, combine the household’s balance sheet and
























where At = Yt − Ct = CF,t − C∗
F,t is the trade balance and Yt = Wt
Pt Lt + Πt is gross domestic
product.
Using equilibrium condition (17) , and deﬁning the share of foreign currency denominated debt
in overall foreign debt as α ≡ StD∗






















Nt−1 + At + AT
t (39)
12This equation states that net worth at time t is equal to the economy’s savings or the trade
balance, At, plus transfers, plus the gross return on the previous period net worth. The gross return
on assets (the term in braquets) is in turn equal to the (gross, percent) cost of servicing foreign
debt weighted by currency denomination.
Using equilibrium conditions (6) and (7) and deﬁning St
St|t−1 ≡ 1+εs
t|t−1 the equilibrium condition





t|t−1)Dt−1 − At − AT
t (40)
where Dt = −Nt, is foreign debt in real terms.






















































γ is the rate of growth of steady state output.11




















t|t−1. The former valuation
eﬀect is the impact of the exchange rate on foreign debt, the latter −which is Lane and Milessi-
Ferreti’s (2005) case−, is the eﬀect of the exchange rate on the cost of servicing foreign debt.
The UIP condition has an important implication on the law of evolution of net worth (41). To



























































t . If monetary policy follows the ﬂoating-exchange-rate regime α = 0 and
∧
it ≃ 0, there is
no cost or valuation eﬀect on foreign debt.
11Note that not only the exchange rate but also the inﬂation rate can cause surprises to foreign debt at time t. The
reason we decided to show the rational expectations error of the exchange rate explicitly and not that of inﬂation is
that the issue at stake is the shock to investors’ risk aversion and its impact on foreign debt through the exchange
rate.
13A diﬀerent situation is when the authorities are faced with a currency crisis and, given a ﬁxed
exchange rate, it is known that α = 1 and nonetheless the exchange rate may be mantained ﬁxed
of may be devalued. If the peg is mantained the eﬀect of the shock to market sentiment on foreign










t . If the currency crashes the eﬀect of the










t . The conclusion is that defending the
currency or letting it depreciate does not make any diﬀerence for the initial impact of the shock on
foreign debt.12
1.8.2 Output
Let small letters denote logarithms, bars denote share of output in the steady state and hats, log



















where σH = σ _
cH, σX = σ _











cF are the shares of home
goods, exports and imports in aggregate demand.
The aggregate demand equation states that output depends on the domestic interest rate, the
foreign interest rate, and the country risk premium. The eﬀect of the domestic interest rate on
output, −(ϑ + σ−1
H ), is negative13. An increase in the domestic interest rate decreases output as
the result of two forces. On the one hand, it appreciates the exchange rate and hence decreases net
exports (the coeﬃcient ϑ). On the other hand, it discourages consumption of the good produced
by the domestic economy (the coeﬃcient σ−1
H ).
The eﬀect of the foreign interest rate on output, ϑ−σ−1
X , is positive. An increase in the foreign
interest rate depreciates the exchange rate and this depreciation stimulates net exports, ϑ. There
is an oﬀsetting eﬀect since the increase in the foreign interest rate decreases foreign output and
then reduces net exports, σ−1
X . The overall eﬀect on domestic aggregate demand is positive.14
The eﬀect of the country risk premium on output is positive. The transmission mechanism
involves an exchange rate depreciation caused by a credit risk premium and, as a result, an increase
in net exports.
12The monetary and exchange rate regime does make a diﬀerence for the bahavior of foreign debt in the medium
term due to the larger response of the trade balance when the exchange rate depreciates.















), this is satisﬁed for reasonable parameter
values.
141.8.3 Capital ﬂows
Capital ﬂows are modelled as the inverse of the trade balance. A positive trade balance is a
































where σF = σ _
cF .
The eﬀect of the domestic interest rate on the trade balance, −(ϑ − σ−1
F ), is negative.15 An
increase in the domestic interest rate appreciates the exchange rate and tends to decrease the
trade balance (the coeﬃcient −ϑ). However, the increase in the domestic interest rate tends to
increase the trade balance because it discourages overall absorption; in particular, it discourages
the imported component of absorption (the coeﬃcient σ−1
F ).
1.9 The complete model in deviation form
The complete model consists of a price block, Equations (45) to (49), an exchange-rate, interest-
rate and risk-spread block, (50) to (58), a ﬂow block, (59) to (61), a stock block (62), and a block












































































16The trade balance is obtained as the residual between output and absorption. For further intuition, the trade






























































































































































































































1.10 The extended model
The extended model incorporates accelerator eﬀects on aggregate demand.
The ﬁnancial accelerator was originally developed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)
to study the eﬀect of the price of physical capital on the balance sheet of entrepreneurs. The
accelerator was later extended to the open economy by CCV and Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci
(2003). Other papers have used the accelerator with prices other than that of physical capital and
for agents other than entrepreneurs. Choi and Cook (2004) use the accelerator to deal with the eﬀect
of the exchange rate on the balance sheet of banks, Aoki, Proudman and Vliegue (2004) (henceforth
APV), use the accelerator to study the price of housing and the balance sheet of households.
A completely realistic model of the cycle in credit and asset prices and of the ﬁnancial accelerator
would include many asset prices and several balance sheets. The reason is that during booms and
busts in credit and asset prices all asset prices and balance sheets typically move together. But for
simplicity in the model of this paper the household’s net worth depends only on one asset price,
the exchange rate.
In the extended version of the model, following APV, the household consists of two members, a
permanent income consumer who solves the household’s maximization problem of the basic model,
and a ﬁnancially constrained consumer who is risk neutral, who borrows abroad and whose con-
sumption depends on net worth. Absorption by the restricted consumer stands for all balance-sheet
related eﬀects on aggregate demand during the cycle in credit and asset prices.
1.10.1 Restricted consumption
Here I outline the agency problem between the domestic borrower and the foreign lender.
17The household borrows at home at the rate it and abroad at the rates i∗
t + φF,t and i∗
t + φH,t.
As monetary policy is autonomous, the household’s cost of borrowing at home, is determined by
the central bank exogenously. In terms of domestic currency, the household’s expected cost of
borrowing abroad is i∗
t + φF,t + st+1|t − st and i∗
t + φH,t depending on the currency denomination
of debt. No matter the response of the central bank to a shock to country risk, the behavior of
the exchange rate, endogenous to the augmented UIP condition, is such that expected depreciation
equalizes the (risk premium adjusted) cost on domestic and foreign debt. In expected terms, the
household is indiﬀerent to the choice of portfolio among the three types of bonds.
The lender charges a premium on the foreign interest rate. The premium varies negatively with
the ﬁnancial condition of the domestic household. The household ﬁnances total excess expenditure
(absorption plus debt service minus output, or the current account) with its wealth (including price
and valuation eﬀects), net of ﬁnancial wealth left to the next period:




t = −it−1(1 + αεs
t|t−1)Dt−1 + At + AT
t is the current account.17
Also, restricted consumption is a function of net worth (including price and valuation eﬀects):
C∆
R,t = χ(̟) (69)
where ̟ = (1 + αεs
t|t−1)Dt−1 and χ′(̟) < 0.
We use χ(̟) = ̟− .
1.10.2 The main ﬂows in the extended model
The restricted member of the household minimizes the cost of buying the home and imported goods
subject to a given level of absorption. Optimization gives the demands for the goods:
C∆











Unrestricted consumers follow the Euler equation:
17The notation A
S






















According to (73), if foreign debt is above (below) the steady state, absorption decreases (in-
creases) and foreign debt decreases (increases) towards the steady state.





























t+1|t − (ϑ + σ−1
UH)
∧
















t+1|t)] and σUH = σ _
cUH.

























































The complete model with a ﬁnancial accelerator consists of the basic model, replacing the ﬂow
block, (59) and (61), with (75) and (77).
1.11 Parameterization
The results are meant to be quantitatively relevant for emerging economies in general.
From the equilibrium conditions of the model, and based on the results of Chang and Velasco
(2006) and Chamon and Haussman (2002) that were mentioned in the introduction, α = λ.
Net foreign assets,
_
n, are −2 in the steady state. This value corresponds to a share of 50% of
GDP. The share of imported goods in aggregate demand,
_
cF, is 0.3. For the central bank reaction
function we used ǫ = 1.0E−4.
In regards to the fundamental parameters, the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, β, is
set at 0.99, which is equivalent to a steady state real interest rate
_
r of 0.01 or 4% in real terms
19at an annual rate. The probability that ﬁrms do not optimize their price, ωH, is 0.75, which is
the standard value used in the literature (see for instance Christiano, Eichembaum and Evans,
2001, hereafter CEE). If the pass-through is immediate, ωF → 0, if it is sluggish, ωF = 0.25.
The degree of persistence in absorption, γ, is 0.9. This is calibrated so that half an output cycle
lasts about four years. The same value is used for the persistence in inﬂation, for simplicity. The
preference parameter, η, is 0.5. The results are robust to a wide range of values in this parameter.
The preference parameter, σ, is set at 3 so that a one percent point shock to the interest rate
for one year causes a one percentage point drop in output. The elasticity of substitution between
domestically produced and imported goods, υ, is 1. The response of the risk premium to net
worth, ζ, is 0.005. This parameter was calibrated so that, after a shock, net worth would return to
equilibrium in about 8 years.
Finally, other steady state parameters are calibrated as follows. The spread,
_
φF,t is calibrated
as 0.005 which corresponds to an annual rate of 2%. The foreign interest rate,
_
r
∗, is set at 0.005,
which is an annual rate of 2%. The growth of trend output,
_
γ, is 0.0075, an annual growth of 3%.
_
Y is 1 by deﬁnition and
_
a
T is 0 for simplicity.
In the extended model, the share of restricted consumption of
_
cR is assumed to be 0.25. The
eﬀect of net worth on restricted consumption,  , is calibrated as 0.03 a small eﬀect as the one found
for wealth eﬀects on aggregate demand in the empirical literature.
2 Results





t (0.25 percentage points in a quarterly basis). We report the results of
the extended model.18 By Equation (9), the country risk premium at time t is equal to the shock





2.1 The shock and the policy response
2.1.1 Fixed-exchange-rate policy: shock absorbed by the interest rate
The policy interest rate moves along with the sum of the credit risk premium and the foreign
interest rate. In response to the shock to the country risk premium, the central bank reaction
function (54) with λ = 1 stabilizes the real exchange rate.
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Figure 1: The shock and the policy response










This is shown in Figures 1-A and 1-B.19
2.1.2 Floating-exchange-rate policy: shock absorbed by the exchange rate
The policy interest rate does not respond to the shock and the exchange rate depreciates (Figure
1-B). Analytically, from ﬁrst order condition (6),
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2.2 Output, absorption and capital ﬂows




















t .20 Equations (59) to (61) become:
19In the simulations, the size of the shock is one percentage point in annual terms or 25 basis points in quarterly























































































The advantage of analyzing the ﬂows and the stock in units of trend output instead of in log
deviation form is that this measure enables us to compare all deviations from the steady state in
the intuitive metric of units of GDP.21
2.2.1 Fixed-exchange-rate policy: output drops
Figure 2-A shows the behavior of the main ﬂows under a shock to country risk and under a ﬁxed
real exchange rate. The graph shows an increase in the trade balance and drops in absorption and
output, the drop in absorption being larger than the drop in output.
Consider these results analytically. Under a policy of a ﬁxed real exchange rate, a positive shock




t > 0. Plugging conditions
21With this measure, in the language of, for example, Galí, López Salido and Vallés (2004), all ﬂow and stock








t = 0 into (78) to (79) reveals that the impact of the shock on output, the trade
balance and absorption is −σ−1
H , σ−1
F and −σ−1 respectively. Then, a shock to the country risk




t < 0, −for a large shock, which is the case of a sudden
stop, this is Krugman’s (2000) “decapitation of the entrepreneurial class”; second, an increase in
the trade balance,22 ∼
a
∆





The drop in absorption, −σ−1
∧
φF,t, is larger that the drop in output, −σ−1
H
∧
φF,t.23 That the drop
in absorption is larger than the drop in output is also implied by the fact that the trade balance
increases. In sum, the results are
∼





An important point to make here is that the tightening of monetary policy is necessary to keep
the exchange rate ﬁxed; this reconciles sudden stops and recessions. The transmission mechanism
that causes the recession is the eﬀect of the interest rate on aggregate demand.
2.2.2 Floating-exchange-rate policy: output increases
The model simulation appears in Figure 2-B. As the exchange rate depreciates, output increases
with the trade balance. Absorption is relatively constant.24
Analytically, if the central bank faces an upward shock to country risk with exchange rate
ﬂexibility, the conditions are
∧







t = 0. Plugging these conditions into
Equations (78) to (79) it is evident that a shock to country risk leads to increases in output and in
the trade balance, while absorption remains unchanged.
The eﬀect of the shock on output (in units of trend output), is similar to the eﬀect of the shock
on the trade balance: ϑ
∧
φF,t. The fact that the rise in output and in the trade balance are similar
is also implied by the fact that the response of absorption to the shock is small.
2.2.3 Discussion
The result of the basic model that under a ﬁxed exchange rate output drops and under a ﬂoating
exchange rate it decreases, is robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model such as degree of
openness, indebtedness and currency denomination of foreign debt. This is because the eﬀect of the




























24In the graph, absorption increases slightly. This is because by (58), the country risk premium depends in part
on net foreign assets.
23Under a ﬂoating exchange rate, the sudden stop has the same consequence on output as in
CKM: sudden stops involve output increases. In CKM there is an output increase because net
exports increase. The reason for the increase in output is that in their paper the policy interest
rate follows the constant foreign interest rate. Also in this paper output increases because net
exports increase. Absorption is constant because the central bank does not change the domestic
interest rate. The puzzle in CKM is explained here since recessions can occur during sudden stops
provided monetary policy “defends” the exchange rate.
Another point to make is that if there is an upward shock to the country risk premium, there
is a transfer or capital outﬂow no matter whether the exchange rate is ﬁxed or ﬂoating.
Finally, note that the drop in output ocurrs with balancesheet conditons that are not critical.
This is unlike CCV where critical balancesheets are necesary for the drop in output. Here output
drops ocurr even in resilient economies due to the eﬀect of the interest rate through the aggregate
demand channel.
2.3 A capital inﬂow
A downward shock to the country risk premium provides a rationale for a capital inﬂow. A central
conclusion is that no matter whether the exchange rate is rigid or ﬂexible, during a downward shock
to the country risk premium the trade balance is in deﬁcit or, in other words, there is a capital
inﬂow.
Another conclusion is that during positive shocks to country risk there is a capital outﬂow and
during negative shocks to country risk there is a capital inﬂow. This result led us to treat upward
and downward shocks to the credit spread and capital outﬂows and inﬂows the same.
3 Conclusion
Sudden stops typically result in drops in output. As shown by CCV, this can be the consequence of
balance sheet eﬀects in ﬁnancially fragile economies. In this paper it is shown that this can also be
the consequence interest rate defenses of the exchange rate, even in ﬁnancially resilient economies.
Fear of ﬂoating creates recessions during capital outﬂows because the central bank increases interest
rates to “defend” the exchange rate. The tight stance of monetary policy decreases aggregate
demand. Unlike the mechanisms surveyed by CKM, the mechanism in this paper that makes a
capital outﬂow cause an output drop is the simple and transparent eﬀect of higher interest rates
24on aggregate demand.
The case of CKM where sudden stops cause output increases takes place when the interest rate
faced by consumers follows the constant foreign interest rate. The increase in net exports, hence,
increases output. Here output decreases because, notwithstanding the increase in net exports, the
increase in the interest rate faced by households decreases absorption and then output.
From the equilibrium conditions of the model, an expression was proposed for the evolution of
net foreign assets.
A limitation of the model is the risk structure of interest rates. In the model the risk premium
enters the (short-term) domestic interest rate through the response of monetary policy when at-
tempting to maintain the exchange rate ﬁxed. In the real world, however, credit risk is embedded
in short-term rates only to a very limited amount, while it is incorporated in long term rates to a
larger extent (see for instance the empirical paper by Galindo and Hofstetter, 2008). Output drops
may be present even with no response of monetary policy to changes to the country risk premium,
because long term rates −the ones that are relevant for aggregate demand− do incorporate the
country risk premium.
Another limitation is that in the model all balance sheets have been aggregated into one, but
the eﬀect of balance sheets in the real world may be much larger due to domino eﬀects; particularly
when the banking sector is involved. This complication may be a rationale behind interest rate
defenses of the exchange rate: the policy has a negative eﬀect on aggregate demand, but any eﬀect
of increased rates on the exchange rate would help tame an ensuing currency and banking crisis
with perhaps more devastating eﬀects on the economy.
Finally, the focus of the paper is in the eﬀects of the response of monetary policy. In the real
world other policies are also typically put to use in response to large bouts of capital inﬂows and
outﬂows: capital controls and changes in international reserves. The study of the eﬀects of these
policies in a DSGE model seems currently outside the reach of the profession.
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294 Appendix: The ﬂexible price equilibrium
The core model has been simpliﬁed by assuming a simple deﬁnition of the output gap. Here, the
model is extended with an output gap deﬁned as the deviation of output from the level of output
that would hold if prices were ﬂexible.
Based on well known results, if prices are ﬂexible, marginal cost is constant. In log deviation
form Equation (96) becomes
0 = η(yo
t − zt) − γη(yo
t−1 − zt−1) + σ(co
t − γco
t−1) + δqo
t − zt (81)

































where technology follows zt = γzt−1 + εz
t .

































Consider the ﬂexible price real interest rate. Solving (4) for the real interest rate and expressing













Regarding the real exchange rate, in the ﬂexible price equilibrium it follows a UIP condition



















The country risk premium follows the risk premium equation:
∧



























The complete model with a ﬂexible price equilibrium consists of a model for equilibrium with
rigid prices and a model for equilibrium with ﬂexible prices. The equilibrium with ﬂexible prices is
given by Equations (82) to (87). The model for equilibrium with rigid prices consists of Equations

































This equation indicates that in the open economy, marginal cost depends on the deviation of
output from the level of output if prices were ﬂexible −the deﬁnition of the output gap−, and also
depends on the gaps of absorption and of the exchange rate.25
5 Mathematical appendix
5.1 The ﬁrm
There is an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms that produce a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods under mo-
nopolistic competition. Each ﬁrm solves two optimization problems. In the ﬁrst problem, the




subject to a given level of output, Yj,t, and given the production technology
Yj,t = ZtLt,j (90)
where Lt,j is the amount of labor hired by ﬁrm j and Zt is an aggregate technology factor
identical for all ﬁrms.





In the second optimization problem, the monopolistic ﬁrm chooses the price of the good it
produces. Following Calvo (1983), Yun (1996) and CEE the ﬁrm re-optimizes its price, each
25To obtain (88), subtract (81) from (48).
31period, with probability ω. If the ﬁrm does not re-optimize, it changes the price by a proportion γ
of lagged inﬂation:
PH,j,t = (1 + πH,t−1)γPH,j,t−1
The ﬁrm’s problem is to pick an optimal price
∼












subject to the demand for good j (Equation (37)).



















[β (1 − ωH)]
l (πH,t+l − πH,t+l−1)}












Linearizing (94) and combining this with (93) gives a Phillips curve that, in terms of the quasi
diﬀerence of inﬂation, π∆



























is marginal cost in log deviation from the steady state.27
5.2 The foreign household
The foreign economy consists of a large number of households. The representative household
maximizes expected utility, which is a function of consumption. In turn, consumptionis a composite
of domestic and foreign goods and the foreign good is a composite of an inﬁnite number of goods.
26Since all ﬁrms that re-optimize choose the same price, subscript j is omitted.







F,t , the product and
consumption wages satisfy Wt/PH,t = (Wt/Pt)Q
δ
t. To obtain (96), combine this expression with (5), (91) and the
production function Yt = ZtLt .










by the choice of
￿
C∗

















































given the endowment {Y ∗
t }
∞
t=0 where ξt is the probability of default, and where C∆∗
t and C∗
A,t
are deﬁned the same way they were deﬁned in the domestic economy.
The foreign economy is an open economy that is large. In the limit, openness tends to zero
and the economy is approximately closed. Also in the limit, net foreign assets tend to zero and
absorption tends to output:
D∗
F,t ≃ 0, DH,t ≃ 0, N∗
t ≃ 0,C∗
t ≃ Y ∗
t (98)


















t ≃ Y ∗
t (100)
First order conditions (6), (7) and (8) of the problem of the household of the domestic economy
may also be derived from the problem of the foreign household.
From the equilibrium conditions it is obtained that the country risk premium is the inverse of
the probability of no default:




For simplicity, we do not consider the probability of default in the problem of the domestic
economy.




































t, and where the quasi diﬀerences C∆∗
H,t and C∆∗
F,t are deﬁned in a way that
should now be obvious.
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
C∆∗




































t (see appendix 5.4.3) and using (100):
C∆∗








Finally, at any time t, the foreign household minimizes the cost of purchasing a bundle of the





by the choice of C∗














F,t, PH,t, PH,j,t, j ∈ (0,1) as given.









28Note that the price of good j imported by the foreign economy is PH,j,t, without an asterisk.
34The equilibrium for the foreign economy is a set of allocations, C∗
t , C∗
F,t, C∗
F,j,t, for t = 0...∞
and j ∈ (0,1), such that foreign households maximize utility (Equations (99) and (97) hold),
minimize the cost of allocating consumption between home and foreign goods (conditions (103),
(106) and (107) hold) and minimize the cost of allocating consumption of the foreign good along
the continuum of diﬀerentiated goods (Equations (109) and (110) hold), given Y ∗
t , Qt, PH,t, PH,j,t,
j ∈ (0,1). In equilibrium, the markets of the good and of the bond both clear (Equations (98) and
(100) hold).
Combining equilibrium conditions (100), (106) and (107), gives the demand for home and foreign
goods by the foreign economy, (32) and (33).
5.3 The steady state
































































































































































































Using the lead of (128) and plugging in the UIP and Euler conditions results in aggregate
demand (59) where σH = σ _
cH, σX = σ _






365.4.2 The trade balance













F,t. Plugging in the demands for























Combining the lead of (129), the UIP condition (6) and the Euler equation (4) gives the ex-
pression for the trade balance (60), where σF = σ _
cF .
5.4.3 Relative prices in terms of the real exchange rate
The optimal choice of the two goods made by the domestic and foreign households gives expressions
for the demand for goods in terms of their relative prices. Here we write those relative prices in
terms of the real exchange rate.
The domestic price of the good produced by the foreign economy is
PF,t = StP∗
H,t (130)
and the foreign price of the good produced by the domestic economy is:
P∗
F,t = PH,t/St (131)
Using the equation for the pass-through (130) and the deﬁnitions for the real exchange rate and
of the CPI, Qt =
StP∗
t














The relative prices of the goods in terms of the real exchange rate are obtained as follows: (132)






























5.4.4 Uncovered interest rate parity
Lagged UIP is St−1 = St|t−1
(1+i∗
t−1)(1+φF,t−1)










37Rearranging and deﬁning 1 + εs
t|t−1 = St
St|t−1 and 1 + s∆
t ≡ St






























. Iterating (6) forward:
St = RtRt+1...Rt+k−1St+k|t (134)








If k is large enough so that the eﬀect of shocks on the exchange rate have vanished out,























Using 1 + εs
t|t−1 = St
St|t−1 and
∧
Rt =
(1+
∧
i
∗
t)(1+
∧
φF,t)
(1+
∧
it)
gives Equation (14).
38